Pizhūhishnāmah-i Iqtiṣād-i Inirzhī-i Īrān (Sep 2014)

The Investigation of Impact of Complement Policy for Energy Price Policy Reform on Transport Sector in Iran by Computable General Equilibrium

  • Roholla Mahdavi

Journal volume & issue
Vol. 3, no. 12
pp. 178 – 145

Abstract

Read online

With regard to the ever-increasing need for energy in current societies to satisfy various requirements, scientists and researchers from different countries, such as Iran, have a basic approach in their agenda to achieve renewable energies، The scientists believe that with regard to the limited fossil fuels and their environmental pollutions, renewable and clean energies can be the first alternative to generate energy، Our country, Iran, has numerous capabilities in the field of generating new and renewable energies، This fact emphasizes the need for an optimum model to develop the use of renewable energies، In line with this objective the costfunction is chosenas the objective function، Given the potential and limits ofrenewable energy (resources Limited), Consumptionof electricpowerin each of16regions (apply Limited) confidencelimits of renewable energy (technical limitations), the model was designed and with use Robust optimization model was solved in LINGO software،The optimum of using renewable energies suggests the 36،71% generation of small hydropower energy, 18،22% wind energy, 17،19% biomass energy, 13،43% geothermal energy, 12،53% tidal energy, and 1% solar energy. 2- Ciaschini, M et al (2011), “The Effects of Environmental Taxation Through a Dynamic CGE Model, Environmental Federalism: The Political Economy of the Design of Local Taxation and Environmental Protection”, Ancona, Italy, December 9-10, 2011 3- Devarajan, S. (1988), “Lecture Notes on Computable General Equilibrium Models”, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Mimeo, Processed. 4- Hosoe.N and et al (2010), “Textbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modelling: Programming and Simulations, Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe”, Chippenham and Eastbourne. 5- IEA (2012), World Energy Outlook. 6- Kulmer Y (2011), “Directed Technological Change in a Bottom-Up/Top-Down CGE model: Analysis of Passenger Transport, "Wegener Center for Climate and Global Change”, University of Graz, Austria. 7- Lofgren.H and et.al (2002), “A Standard Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model in GAMs”, International Food Policy Research Institute. 8- Orlov. A, Grethe. H and McDonald S, (2011), “Energy Policy and Carbon Emission in Russia: A Short Run CGE Analysis”, Presented at the 14th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis”, Venice, Italy.Solaymani. 9- S and Kari. F (2014), “Impacts of Energy Subsidy Reform on the Malaysian Economy and Transportation Sector”, Energy Policy, pp. 115-125. 10- Zhengning Pu and Hayashiyama Y (2012), Energy Resource Tax Effects on China’s Regional Economy by SCGE Model, Environmental Economics, vol. 3, issue 1, pp. 41-52. bidi13- Stern, J. (2007), “Gas-OPEC: A Distraction from Important Issues of Russian Gas Supply to Europe”. Oxford Energy Comment. 14- J.F. Nash Jr. (1950), “The Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica, 15(2):155_162. 17- Avrachenkov, K., Elias, J., Martignon, F., Neglia, G. and L. Petrosyan (2011), “A Nash bargaining solution for Cooperative Network Formation Games”, Networking 2011, pages 307–318, 2011 16- Shapley ,L. (1953), “A Value for n-person Games”, In H. Kuhn and A. Tucker, editors, Contribution to the Theory of Games II, page 307. Princeton University Press. 17- Shapley, L., and Shubik, M. (1969), “On Market Games”, Journal of Economic Theory, 1, 9-25. 19- Maskin, Erik (2003), “Coalitional Bargaining with Externalities, Keynote Lecture for the European Economic Association Conference 2003, Stockholm. 20-OME. “Future Natural Gas Supply Options and Supply Costs for Europe”, Report to Madrid Forum, Observatoire M´editerran´een de l’ Energie, 2004 21- Egging, R. and Gabriel, S. A.(2006), “Examining Market Power in the European Natural Gas Market”, Energy Policy, 34:2762–2778.

Keywords