Assessment of wind-related storage investment options in a market-based environment

Abstract

With the increasing share of wind power in the energy sector, many countries start to cut back supporting policies for wind power and shift towards market-oriented schemes, challenging the profitability of wind farms. Energy storage offers a flexible solution to enhance their profitability. This work explores different wind-related storage investment modes, including 1) direct ownership, 2) cooperative, and 3) competitive modes in a market-based environment. For the direct ownership mode, a bilevel single-leader-single–follower Stackelberg game model is proposed, where wind farms invest in and operate storage facilities strategically to maximize their profits in the upper level, while the lower-level problem represents the system operator’ s market-clearing process. A cooperative game framework is presented for the cooperative mode, that wind farms and storage investors agree on a profit allocation rule, i.e., Shapley value or Nucleolus to collaborate in investing and bidding as a coalition. The competitive mode is interpreted as a multi-leader-single-follower Stackelberg game, describing an independent investor investing in and operating storage facilities in competition with wind farms. Case studies conducted on a 6-bus and the IEEE 30-bus test systems demonstrate that storage facilities directly invested in by wind farms are the best option for maximizing their profits, resulting in up to an 8.7% increase. The cooperative option provides a suboptimal increase of up to 3.1%, diversifying the costs and risks associated with storage investments. In contrast, the competitive mode can diminish wind farms’ profitability, with up to a 30.6% decrease in profits.

Keywords

• Bilevel Model
• Electricity Market
• Energy Storage
• Price Maker
• Wind Power