Metaphysics (Sep 2010)

John Searle on Institutional Facts

  • m Abdullahi,
  • M Janmohammadi

Journal volume & issue
Vol. 2, no. 5
pp. 1 – 22

Abstract

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One general categorization by some of the contemporary analytic philosophers divides the facts into institutional and brute. The characteristic of institutional facts is that they are constituted by collective recognition. Typically, these facts follow the constitutive rules formula: "X in C counts as Y". These facts have raised some important questions for philosophers: How is it possible that some facts are realized only through human recognition? What is the nature of institutional facts? Can we count them as objective? If yes, in what sense? Here we argue that the essence of institutional facts is status functions. Humans recognize these functions which contain a set of deontic powers through collective intentionality. Therefore, institutional facts are ontologically subjective and epistemologically objective. Nevertheless, objectivity of institutional facts totally depends on language which itself is a fundamental institution for other institutions.

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