Ontologie della resistenza: note sul concetto di materia in N. Hartmann e G. Lukács

Abstract

The essay discusses the topic of matter in N. Hartmann and G. Lukács. It shows how both of them use their own concepts of matter in order to counter correlativistic philosophies – such as Phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism, Existentialism, Pragmatism, Positivism, Empirio-Criticism or Conventionalism – which reduce the real world to the laws of thought, to those of the absolute consciousness or to scientific laws, therefore eliminating the resistance of the reality and the meaning of praxis and dialectic in front of the givenness of the world. While Hartmann uses the concept of matter in order to revive the idea of a reality going beyond the laws of thought, Lukács uses Hartmann’s ontology in order to counter the philosophies that, by excluding the exceedance of reality and matter, provide theories which appear to him functional to the capitalist society.

Keywords

• N. Hartmann
• G. Lukács
• Ontology
• Correlativism
• Matter
• History of philosophy