Manager's Transactions: From Signal Effekt to Market Transparency

Abstract

As of 3 July 2016, the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) lays down a uniform, EUwide obligation for managers of listed issuers to disclose transactions conducted on their own account regarding financial instruments of said issuers. Compared to the previous legal regime, the regulatory approach relating to this reporting obligation has changed considerably: it no longer serves to provide investors with information from which they may potentially draw conclusions regarding the price performance of the financial instruments concerned. Rather, the purpose of disclosure is to create the highest possible market transparency. Despite this change, the currently sparse doctrine largely interprets Art 19 MAR in relation to the intended signal effect according to the previous legal regime. 1 This article considers the new legal framework from the viewpoint of Austrian and German law, and shows that in assessing the new rules, the change in objectives has to be taken into account

Keywords

• directors dealings
• reporting obligation
• signal effect
• market transparency
• market integrity
• de minimis threshold
• information overload