The paradox of government-funded innovation in weakly institutionalized environments

Abstract

Government intention to spur innovation can result in the proliferation of low-quality patents, which is especially pronounced in countries with a low level of government accountability. This study examines the paradoxical effects of government-funded innovation in weakly institutionalized environments. I offer a game-theoretic model, in which the government has a stake in technological development and invests in research and development, although this encourages the growth of low-quality patents. Using Russian patents data between 1998 and 2016, I illustrate this mechanism by demonstrating the causal impact of Russia's government policy, which resulted in a simultaneous increase in the number of patents and a decrease in the absolute number of high-quality patents in the patent pool. This study provides a theoretical background for evaluating the impact of political incentives for investing in the creation of new technologies in the technological development of countries.

Keywords

• O32;O33;O38;O43