Investment in Data Analytics with Manufacturer Encroachment

Abstract

Online retail platforms such as Amazon and Tmall have the ability to create personalized recommendations based on the consumer’s browsing history, purchase history, and preferences by investing in data analytics capability. In practice, manufacturers may encroach on the retail market through the agency channel that sells products directly to online consumers in addition to wholesale products to retail platforms through the reselling channel. In this study, we develop a game-theoretic model to study the interplay between the manufacturer’s encroachment and the online retail platform’s data analytics capability investment. Our outcomes reveal that the conditions for the manufacturer to encroach become more lenient if the platform invests in data analytics capability, and we show that the investment in data analytics capability can lead to a Pareto improvement and the manufacturer can free ride on the platform’s investment. Moreover, we found that the manufacturer’s encroachment always creates more incentives for the platform to enhance the investment level in data analytics capability. Our research in this study provides useful insights for managers to make encroachment decisions and data analytics capability investment decisions with the manufacturer who sells through the online retail platform.

Keywords

• channel structure
• data analytics
• game theory
• manufacturer encroachment