Variability in repeated economic games: comparing trust game decisions to other social trust measures

Abstract

Economic games are well-established tools that offer a convenient approach to study social behaviour. Although widely used, recent evidence suggests that decisions made in the context of standard economic games are less predictive of real-world behaviour than previously assumed. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that economic games decisions in the laboratory are more likely to be influenced by the current situation, while questionnaires are specifically designed to measure people's average behaviour across a long period of time. To test this hypothesis, we performed a longitudinal study where 275 respondents played 16 Trust games every two days within a three-week period, and filled out a questionnaire that measures social trust. This study confirmed the instability of our measure of trust behaviour over time and the substantial stability of questionnaire responses. However, we found a significant association between self-reported social trust and participants' average behaviour in the trust game measured across sessions, but also with participants' behaviour measured only in Session 1. Nevertheless, analysis of behavioural changes in the Trust games over time revealed different behavioural profiles, highlighting how economic games and questionnaires can complement each other in the study of social trust.

Keywords

• repeated economic games
• self-reported questionnaires
• variability
• external validity
• social trust
• trust game