La prima campagna d’Italia di Bonaparte come guerra d’intelligence

Abstract

The first Italian campaign of Bonaparte is one of the most studied topics in military history, but not always from the point of view of intelligence, which has played an important role. In particular Jean Landrieux (1756-1830), leaving historiographical traces especially in Italy, attracted interest for a long time more for the singular and controversial personality than in relation to the operational performance; In fact, Landrieux was not head of the services, but this branch began to be conducted with a modern approach (making use of informants such as Rusca, Pico or Toli), function of the general staff activity and unconventional warfare. However, the Armée d’Italie was not the only one to use an intelligence network, but the Piedmontese or the Venetians and above all the English did too, although their warfare was ‘peninsular’ and naval. However, the events demonstrated the temporary French superiority, thanks to the centralization of the command and the organization of the general staff.