¿Es posible reclamar un supuesto derecho a ser desgraciados? El “mundo feliz” de la eugenesia

Abstract

In the discussion about the ethical implications of genetic engineering it is usual to distinguish between negative and positive eugenics. Negative eugenics refers to genetic imperfections correction procedures, which aim to avoid or minimize the transmission of hereditary diseases. Positive eugenics consists in the improvement or optimization of features considered desirable (as beauty or intelligence). One thing is to repair, for therapeutic purposes, a genetic error, and another to genetically improve a feature considered good and desirable. In this sense one could ask if it is a moral duty to avoid, through genetic engineering, impairments in newborns, saving them from an unfortunate life; and if there is also an equivalent moral duty to guarantee that children possess beauty and intelligence. This paper aims to answer both questions through an evaluation of the arguments for and against eugenics proposed by Singer and Nussbaum. I will hold that though there is a moral obligation to apply negative eugenics, this kind of obligation is not present in the case of positive eugenics. This implies that it is not possible to demand a presumed right to be miserable, either from the parent’s or the future children’s point of view, in the case of negative eugenics, although this presumed right to be miserable seems to be more defensible in the case of positive eugenics.

Keywords

• eugenics
• human genome
• preventive principle
• singer
• nussbaum