ZIMMERMANN’S CRITICS OF JASPER’S DENYING THE METAPHYSICAL COGNITION

Abstract

In this paper the author confronts Karl Jaspers and Stjepan Zimmermann’s attitudes about the possibility, range and scope of metaphysics as a rational activity. While Jaspers thinks that a mind is an inadequate medium as far as transcendental reality is concerned, so the scope of metaphysics, according to him, can’t be in conceiving objective truth about the last base of essence, than possibly in the lightening up the spaces in which we meet with entire essence – Zimmermann thinks that the rational establishment of metaphysics is necessary and correct. For Zimmerman metaphysics is possible in the first place because it is like natural sciences based on empiric quality and ideal judgments. The method of deductive inference and causality is for them a common “bridge” to the non-phenomenal reality; only a natural scientist restricts himself to this special area, and a metaphysician covers entire non-phenomenal reality as a source of phenomenal world and life.

Keywords

• metaphysics
• cognition
• mind
• world
• phenomenon
• causality principle.