How should the regulatory defaults be set?

Abstract

How to choose defaults in risk-informed regulations depends on the conservatism implicated in regulatory defaults. Without a universal agreement on the approaches dealing with the conservatism of defaults, however, the desirability of conservatism in regulatory risk analyses has long been controversial. The opponent views it as needlessly costly and irrational, and the proponent as a form of protection against possible omissions or underestimation of risks. Moreover, the inherent ambiguity of risk makes it difficult to set suitable defaults in terms of risk. This paper, the extension of the previous work [1], focuses on the effects of different levels of conservatism implicated in regulatory defaults on the estimates of risk. According to the postulated behaviors of regulated parties and the diversity of interests of regulators, in particular, various measures for evaluating the effect of conservatism in defaults are developed and their properties are explored. In addition, a simple decision model for setting regulatory defaults is formulated, based on the understanding of the effect of conservatism implicated in them. It can help decision makers evaluate the levels of safety likely to result from their regulatory policies. Keywords: Regulatory default, Conservatism, Decision-making, Risk analysis, Optimization, Risk-informed regulation, Nuclear regulatory commission