Philosophy of Justice in the Context of Ukraine

Abstract

This article investigates one of the major problems of modern political philosophy – the problem of justice in its fundamentally important methodological measurement in the Context of Ukraine. It’s consistently shown that justice belongs to a prominent place among the moral and social values: particularly its people owe to each other, because it is the scale, which measured freedom, equality and human rights.For this purpose it is analyzed the relationship and difference of methodological changes in grasping the concept of justice in the works of K-O-Apel, J.Habermas, O.Höffe, R.Forst. It was found that Habermas interprets a new essence of solidarity and justice as normative principles of a democratic state where the requirement of respect for the dignity of each based on the acceptance of the inviolability of his body, life and property. It is proved that O.Höffe draws attention to the need of fundamental changes in the understanding of social justice, emphasizing the pre-modern, paternalistic sense of distributive models. Іn the writings of R.Frost social justice gain a political dimension, just as political or social relationship can exist only in case of their full justification, respect for human dignity. In the latest theories of justice is said that the victim of injustice is firstly the one who is ignored both in the process of manufacturing and distribution of public goods. To conclude: only the justice of exchange permits us to solve the immediate, practical dilemma: should one hand over a part of one’s freedom to social, state, authoritative structures, or be independent of them and be unable to resort to their assistance in case of emergency. People, perforce, mutually abandon part of their freedom as legal agents in order to enjoy their right for freedom. If this abandonment is universal, such exchange may be considered just. By insisting that everything individual is also social because it requires and is embedded into social context, R.Forst presents intersubjectivity as a fundamental dimension of human existence that shows itself in our ability to self-determination, i.e. freedom, but within the limits of human community. Also his point is that our obligations are no less rooted in our existence than our rights, and law has no priority over good and depends on moral good as a defining factor of justice.

Keywords

• recognition, solidarity, moral principles, freedom, transcendental exchange, political anthropology