SC-DDPL as a Countermeasure against Static Power Side-Channel Attacks

Abstract

With the continuous scaling of CMOS technology, which has now reached the 3 nm node at production level, static power begins to dominate the power consumption of nanometer CMOS integrated circuits. A novel class of security attacks to cryptographic circuits which exploit the correlation between the static power and the secret keys was introduced more than ten years ago, and, since then, several successful key recovery experiments have been reported. These results clearly demonstrate that attacks exploiting static power (AESP) represent a serious threat for cryptographic systems implemented in nanometer CMOS technologies. In this work, we analyze the effectiveness of the Standard Cell Delay-based Precharge Logic (SC-DDPL) style in counteracting static power side-channel attacks. Experimental results on an FPGA implementation of a compact PRESENT crypto-core show that the SC-DDPL implementation allows a great improvement of all the security metrics with respect to the standard CMOS implementation and other state-of-the-art countermeasures such as WDDL and MDPL.

Keywords

• static power
• side-channel attacks
• cryptographic hardware
• nanometer CMOS
• countermeasure
• PRESENT