The future of cognitive science is pluralistic, but what does that mean?

Abstract

We imagine the future of cognitive science by first considering its past, which shows remarkable transformation from a field that, although interdisciplinary, was initially marked by a narrow set of assumptions concerning its subject matter. In the last decades, multiple alternative frameworks with radically different ontological and epistemic commitments (e.g., situated cognition, embodied cognition, extended mind) found broad support. We address the question of how to understand these changes, noting as logical alternatives that (1) newer approaches are not properly cognitive; (2) that newer approaches are cognitive but not science; and (3) that cognitive science has become pluralistic. We endorse the third position and venture to guess that the future of cognitive science is also pluralistic. We are left, however, with the question of what this means. After noting the polysemous nature of the term “pluralism”, we attempt to add clarity by distinguishing three forms: ontological, epistemic, and ethical. We then consider what each form might imply for the future of cognitive science.

Keywords

• cognitive science
• pluralism
• relativism
• history of science
• philosophy of science