The Hungarian View of the Battle of Muhi (April 11, 1241): A New Interpretation of Historiographic Traditions

Abstract

The victory of Batu’s army in 1241 has been regarded by both Hungarian and foreign historians as a textbook example of flawed preparation and a badly-fought battle. This is where we run into a question that historians constantly return to: whether the Hungarian defeat was due to the decline of the light cavalry and the one-sided western-style tactics, or possibly the weakness of the heavy cavalry. We know well enough from existing research, however, that the causes of the Hunga­rian defeat are not to be sought in the Hungarians’ tactical inflexibility. Indeed, a new interpretation of sources containing accounts of the battle reveals signs of attempts to adapt combat tactics to the circumstances. The execution of the tactics on each side, however, were decisively influenced by differences in military technology, morale and quality of leadership. The Mongol commanders were able to order their disciplined troops to carry on the struggle even after incurring serious losses from Hungarian charges, and in the later phase of the battle, they had rested units at their disposal, while the Hungarian knights started to ignore the commands and withdraw from the battle as their combat position deteriorated, and the deployable troops of the Hungarian army gradually dwindled. It was therefore primarily the Mongols’ discipline, experience and smoothly-running command system that put them ahead of the Hungarians, whose commanders lacked coordination and were not able to keep a firm grip on their troops. Consequently, when the position became critical, the potential for coherent action faded.

Keywords

• mongol invasion
• medieval hungarian kingdom
• battle of muhi
• wagon fort
• eastern warfare