Étudier les biens communs par les changements institutionnels : régimes de propriété autour des races animales face à l’innovation génomique
Abstract
This article aims at using the analytical framework proposed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) for a dynamic description of property rights in the management of common resources, here animal genetic resources. Animal genetic resources, and more specifically ruminant breeds (cattle and sheep), are common resources (belonging to farmers communities). They have been much less privatized than plant genetic resources (where varieties belong to firms). We describe the evolution of “institutional regimes of selection” of these resources over time, and how these regimes are destabilized due to political and technological changes (genomic selection). We show how these commons are not only biological resources, but also rely on informational resources and management structures for producing genetic gain, constituting an “intangible property”. We analyze the co-production of genetic and informational resources, focusing on evolving property regimes and governance structures. Indeed, an analysis only in terms of property rights on biological resources, without taking into account the intangible property, would not provide a satisfactory explanation for understanding actual changes. We show how this analytical framework, used with a dynamic perspective, allows for highlighting changes that would have stayed invisible otherwise, such as the destabilization of an institutional regime through its informational dimension.
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