Orthodox representations of God and implicit anthropomorphic reasoning

Abstract

The phenomenon of theological incorrectness is primarily the result of the coexistence of two parallel levels of religious representations constituting a continuum of cognitive complexity. This article presents results of the replication experiment based on the classical study by J. L. Barrett and F. Keil (1996) aimed at diff erentiating levels of implicit anthropomorphic and explicit non-anthropomorphic reasoning about God. The data which were obtained in the experiment and based on the Russian Orthodox sample of Theology students have confi rmed the cross-cultural universality and stability of the phenomenon of theological incorrectness described by J. L. Barrett and now widely accepted in the cognitive religious science. In a real-thinking mode aimed at rapid solutions to problems, complicated and cognitively cumbersome theological concepts do undergo systematic deformation and optimisation and acquire anthropomorphic properties corresponding to our default ontological assumptions. Such a tacit deformation seems to be independent from theological representations and occurs even in the presence of explicitly held non-anthropomorphic concepts of God.

Keywords

• антропоморфизм
• религиозные агенты
• религиозные понятия
• когнитивное религиоведение
• психология религии
• когнитивные схемы
• когнитивные искажения