Fixed Reference to Divine Realm

Abstract

One of the challenges of religious language is how to reconcile these two theses: the transcendence of the divine realm and conventional reference to that realm. This challenge raised since it seems, at first glance, that ‘if the divine realm is transcendent, i.e., completely separated from the human realm, then one, a human, cannot make a fixed reference to that realm.’ In this paper, extending Putnam’s model-theoretic argument in metaphysics, I argue that this conditional statement could be true, and thereby the transcendence of the divine realm and conventional reference to that realm would be irreconcilable unless we adjust at least one of our presuppositions. I will show just three ways for this adjustment: Internal pluralism that says that the divine realm is mind-dependent; Some versions of apophatic theology according to which one cannot assert a true utterance about the divine realm; Claiming that language is a non-human phenomenon.

Keywords

• religious language
• model-theoretic argument
• hilary putnam
• internal pluralism
• apophatic theology