Kalmyks in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774: Tactical Structure and Organizational Supply Revisited

Abstract

Introduction. The article reviews events to have aimed at preparing Russia’s military for the war against Turkey in the late 1760s. The former included both general strategy development and involvement of Kalmyk troops. Special attention was paid to the preparation of orders on Kalmyk cavalry’s mobilization, its distribution across Russian army groups, elaboration of tactical plans, provisioning and allowances. Goals. So, the study aims at answering the latter set of questions. Materials and methods. The paper analyzes documents and materials form the National Archive of Kalmykia, Archive of Foreign Policy of Imperial Russia, and a number of government decrees published in Collections of the Imperial Russian Historical Society and the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Results and conclusions. Having been the only combat effective force of Imperial Russia in the Lower Volga and North Caucasus, the Kalmyk Khanate was given utmost significance. In early April of 1769, Viceroy Ubashi gathered almost the whole of his troops in Yashkol area. The corps of Lieutenant General M. J. von Berg enforced with a ten thousand Kalmyk cavalry led by Prince Kirip was largely responsible for the Crimean direction. Another ten thousand cavalry group under the command of Viceroy Ubashi was to join the corps of Major General J. F. von Medem and suppress landlords of Kabardia that tended to support Turkey. After the departure of the twenty thousand troops all uluses (domains) were ordered to stay on the right bank of the Volga. But the subsequent campaign of 1769 unexpectedly witnessed a series of conflicts to have resulted from insufficient allowances and provisioning of Kalmyk military units.

Keywords

• kalmyks
• kalmyk khanate
• russo-turkish war of 1768–1774
• kabardia