Filosofický časopis (Aug 2023)

Čo iné je poznanie, ak nie zdôvodnené pravdivé presvedčenie?

  • Taliga, Miloš

DOI
https://doi.org/10.46854/fc.2023.3r.475
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 71, no. 3
pp. 475 – 488

Abstract

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If truth is an objective property of statements, then we are faced with the following dilemma: If the condition of truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge can neither evolve nor disappear because true statements cannot become false, and at the same time, if the condition of truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge can also be something that is false. The condition of truth either is or is not a necessary condition of knowledge. Therefore: either knowledge cannot evolve or disappear, or knowledge can also be something that is false. The author of the article attempts to resolve the dilemma by a critical analysis of its conjunctive premise. He rejects the condition of truth as a necessary condition of knowledge in order to make room for the evolution and extinction of knowledge. He argues that the evolution and extinction of knowledge can be explained if we understand knowledge as unrefuted criticizable hypotheses. He provides his explanation within the framework of the philosophy of science of critical rationalism.

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