Analysis on Game Evolution of Latecomer Prefabricated Building Firm from the Perspective of Population Ecology

Abstract

Based on the research and development (R&D) state of prefabricated buildings, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model involving such three parties as latecomer prefabricated building firm (LPBF), related firm, and university-research institute, and simulates the evolutionary results of the game to determine the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the game. The results show that: In the tripartite system evolution, the evolution and trend of each party are closely related with the strategies chosen by the other two parties; eventually, the LPBF strategy always converges to R&D, while the strategies of related firm, and university-research institute always converge to cooperation in R&D. Whether the game system converges to the desired equilibrium state hinges on the R&D profit and cost of, and opportunistic profit from subsequent cooperation with the LPBF. During the development of prefabricated buildings, the game parties should promote the high-quality development of the industry by stepping up technological R&D, forging a complete industrial chain, and implementing industry-university-research cooperation.

Keywords

• Prefabricated building
• Latecomer firm
• Tripartite game
• Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
• Industrial development