St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology (Apr 2024)
The Natures, Minds, and Wills of Christ in Christian Philosophy
Abstract
This article surveys the controversies concerning Jesus’ natures, minds, and wills. It begins with an overview of the debates concerning the exegesis of relevant scriptural passages; the historical controversies leading up to the landmark Chalcedonian Definition (451 CE); and significant post-Chalcedonian developments, as illustrated by the contributions of Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus, the debate between Lutheran and Reformed theologians, and the rise of ontological kenoticism. This is followed by a discussion on the abstractist versus concretist view of Jesus’ natures, its relation to two parts versus three parts Christology, and how apparently contradictory divine and human properties can be predicated of Christ (communicatio idiomatum). A comparison is then offered between two-consciousnesses versus one-consciousness models (including ontological kenotic model and divine subconscious/preconscious model), and the use of psychological analogies for some of these models is examined. It will be shown that the acceptance of different models of Jesus’ mind(s) is motivated by different conceptions of essential divine properties (e.g. the affirmation of divine simplicity, essential divine atemporality, and a strong notion of divine immutability by strict classical theism verses alternative conceptions), essential human properties, the unity of the person, and the doctrine of kenosis (ontological versus different forms of functional kenosis). Subsequently, this article discusses the controversy between monothelitism and (different forms of) dyothelitism (‘human will moved by divine will’ versus ‘one Logos who is the subject of divine willing and human willing’), and its relation to the controversy concerning Jesus’ impeccability. Finally, this article explains the relevance of the topic for the Christian community.
