Na cestě k ideálu: sociální spravedlnost, normativní diverzita a modelování v politické filosofii

Abstract

Set against the background of the clash between ideal and non-ideal theorising in political philosophy, this review article outlines two complex approaches to the modelling of an ideal of justice. We reconstruct the moderately anti-utopian position championed by Gerald Gaus, who suggests we should give up the efforts to discover a conclusive truth about ideal justice, and confront it with David Estlund’s steadfast belief that unearthing some such ideal is nevertheless a preeminent philosophical goal. Utilising Gaus’s formalised model of what searching for an ideal of justice must encompass, we show why the formulation of the normative ideal depends on the very conditions of and obstacles to the achievement of such an ideal. Under conditions of normative pluralism which is ubiquitous in constitutional democracies, this means that the first desideratum of modelling an ideal should be outlining the ways of productively harnessing the diverse perspectives which populate any reasonably free society. Put bluntly, discovering an ideal requires giving up the philosophical search for the ideal. Ramifications for how best to construe the vocation of political philosophy as such are substantial: Rather than monologically digging deeper and deeper towards an elusive ideal of justice which tells us what we collectively ought to do, we need to figure out how to make cohabitation of contrasting worldviews possible, perhaps even enjoyable. We conclude the article by linking the argument to a defence of convergence public justification we offered in a previous paper.

Keywords

• theories of justice
• normative diversity
• ideal theorising
• modelling ideals
• gaus
• estlund
• convergence and consensus public justification