Thinking of Identity as Self and Body. Recent Contributions from Phenomenology, Cognitive Studies, and Neuroscience

Abstract

In recent years, phenomenology has increasingly engaged in dialogue with the cognitive sciences, the neurosciences, and psychopathology. In particular, the foci of this debate are: the structure of consciousness and conscious acts, the different forms of self-awareness, the inquiry concerning the self and its disturbances, and intersubjectivity. Two recent volumes bear witness to this flourishing debate. The first one, Body Memory, Metaphor, and Movement deals with the issue of embodied subjectivity and is particularly concerned with the phenomenon of implicit body memory and collects contributions from phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, and embodied therapies. The second one, The Oxford Handbook of the Self brings together contributions from phenomenological, cognitive, and psychopathological research and addresses the topic of the Self from the diverse standpoints expressed by these areas of studies. The issue of the Self is analyzed with regard to various perspectives such as bodily existence, the formation of personal identity, metaphysical inquiry, the moral dimension and the pathologies of the self. The essay aims to provide a critical assessment of these volumes and to discuss their theoretical impact on current phenomenological and cognitive research.

Keywords

• Selfhood
• Bodily Memory
• Intersubjectivity
• Individuality
• Brain Processes