Acta Iuris Stetinensis (Jan 2022)
Can the Notion of the Rule of Law Be Applied to the UN System?
Abstract
The paper demonstrates that the Charter of the United Nations contains some incompatible norms, a fact that directly impacts the organization’s system of collective security. The voting procedure of the Security Council, privileging its permanent members, stands in open contradiction to the Charter’s principle of “sovereign equality” of all member states. Article 27(3) of the Charter makes uniform enforcement of the prohibition of the international use of force impossible because it effectively exempts the organization’s five permanent members. Those states can block any decision of the Council even in cases when they are themselves party to a dispute. The problem is further aggravated by a lack of checks and balances in the UN system in general. The International Court of Justice has no competence to rule on the Security Council’s use of its vast coercive powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. The supreme executive organ of the UN can act as “index in causa sui.” Thus, the lack of a separation of powers – in tandem with the statutory privilege of some of the most powerful states – makes the “rule of law” an elusive idea in the intergovernmental system of the United Nations.
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