پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (Oct 2015)
Ashtiani’s Objections to Mudarres’s Theory of “Bodily Resurrection”
Abstract
Relying on the applicability of principles of Transcendent Philosophy for reconstructing religious beliefs, Aqa Ali Mudarres has tried to give a new explanation of “bodily resurrection”. He does this by appealing to the purely Sadraian philosophical principles as well as his method in which he begins by agreeing with popular beliefs and ends with a departure from them. Appealing to some Sadraian ontological principles as “substantial motion” as well as his principles of self-knowledge, Mudarres explains bodily resurrection to be the return of the mundane body to the soul in resurrection. Thus, neither does he assume that the mundane body is the destination of the soul, nor he asserts, as Sadra does, that the soul itself is subject to resurrection. Ashtiani have raised many objections against Mudarres’s theory, which include the continuance of the relation between body and soul after death, the continuance of substantial motion after detachment of the soul, tendency to the Ash’arite theories and the very objections which can be raised against the Ash’arite theory of bodily resurrection. Reviewing the Sadraian principles and the dispute between Mudarres and Ashtiani represents the dynamism of Sadraian philosophy during the centuries.
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