Oggetti matematici non-esistenti come truthmakers: meinonghianismo strong e l’argomento di indispensabilità

Abstract

There has been much discussion of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. However, there has been little discussion of the relationship between Meinongianism and the indispensability argument. According to strong Meinongianism: i) some objects do not exist; ii) we can refer to and quantify over nonexistent objects to make true statements about them; and iii) nonexistent objects are the truthmakers of sentences which contain reference to or/and quantification over nonexistent objects. In this paper, against the mainstream Quinean meta-ontology, I argue that there are nonexistent mathematical objects as truthmakers and that nonexistent mathematical objects make a difference for the way the concrete world is.

Keywords

• nonexistent objects
• indispensability argument
• truthmaker