Evolutionary Game Analysis for Key Participants’ Behavior in Digital Transformation of the Chinese Construction Industry

Abstract

The transformation and upgrading of the construction industry has made obvious progress in China. However, the low degree of digitalization is still prominent. The digital transformation decision-making behavior of key participants in the construction industry is easily affected by economic interests, meaning that the implementation of digital transformation is a dynamic evolution process of repeated adjustment and continuous learning. Therefore, this study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, service providers, and construction enterprises, and analyzed the strategy selection of each game player and the stability of the system equilibrium point. Moreover, the validity of the model and the influence of various factors on the system were verified and analyzed by numerical simulation. The results showed the following: (1) The government’s tax refund ratio and subsidy coefficient can significantly increase the motivation of construction enterprises and digital construction service providers within a certain threshold. (2) Whether enterprises carry out a comprehensive digital transformation depends on the revenue of the system solution strategy; the greater the revenue, the more positive the enterprises. (3) The adoption of high rewards and high penalties by the superior government can effectively encourage the local government to actively promote digital transformation. The contribution of this study lies in providing a theoretical basis and decision support for promoting the digital transformation of construction enterprises.

Keywords

• digital transformation
• construction industry
• evolutionary game
• construction enterprises