Revista d'Estudis Autonòmics i Federals (Mar 2011)
POSICIÓN Y FUNCIONES DE LOS ESTATUTOS DE AUTONOMÍA EN LA STC 31/2010
Abstract
In a line similar to that proposed in the State Council Report of 16 February 2006 on modifi cations to the Constitution, the Constitutional Court Ruling31/2010 has severely limited the constitutional functions of the Statutes of Autonomy while denying them any special legislative category outside thosefound in any other type of organic law. According to the jurisprudentialdoctrine of the declaration, it is clear that the Statutes of Autonomy are notadequate regulations for defining the powers and functions contained inthe powers that they attribute to the respective Autonomous Communities,therefore although they can be “described” these provisions lack regulatoryforce. Neither can the Statutes contemplate a possible development of the Autonomous State, given that the constitutional categories that belong toit and even the sub-matters over which it exercises competent functions constitutean interpretative monopoly of the Constitutional Court. This set oflimitations and inabilities mean that the Statutes of Autonomy cannot ensurean ambit of exclusive autonomous powers because, under any circumstances,the State has the power to regulate the corresponding matters usingits horizontal powers, and moreover, with the effect of supremacy. Andin the end, in relation to shared powers, the State can defi ned the basics inthe amount of detail and under the form of regulations it considers appropriate(legislative, regulatory or executive). We are therefore looking at anew attempt to declare the process of autonomy as being closed, denyingthe Statutes of possible exercising the device principle and eradicating withinthem, in appropriate feedback, their regulatory strength and their constitutional functions of origin.
