Princípios (Dec 2007)
A fundamentação das ciências compreensivas: a posição de Dilthey reconstruída a partir de Leibniz, Wolff e Kant
Abstract
Dilthey’s work fills a fundamental role in contemporary philosophy insofar as Dilthey distinguishes two spheres through which we have access to all of reality: objective experience (die Erfahrung) and lived experience (das Erlebnis). This distinction allows Dilthey, in contrast to the natural sciences, to conceive of the conditions of evidence and validity of the comprehensive sciences. Even if not named in exactly these terms, this distinction will be at the base of the texts of many authors at the end of the 19th Century and in the 20th Century. Although Dilthey elaborates his theory throughout his vast works, our objective is to reconstruct this distinction he establishes from the way he reinterprets the principle of sufficient reason as formulated by Leibniz and Wolff. Following that, we also seek to show how this reinterpretation allows Dilthey to contrast the sphere of knowledge related to lived experience from the sphere of theoretical knowledge circumscribed by Kant. As such, the principal argument presented here establishes a connection between the way Dilthey reinterprets the principle of sufficient reason and the way he scientifically reconstructs the foundation for the comprehensive sciences, conceiving of them as based on a specific relation between evidence and validity.
