Pricing of Responsive Feeder Transit Considering Competitive Relationships With Bike Sharing

Abstract

The pricing problem for demand-responsive feeder transit (RFT) in competitive relationships with public bicycles in bicycle-sharing systems is investigated from a game-theoretic perspective to establish a feeder program for passengers traveling to and from transport hubs. First, a revenue model including the base fare and passenger travel delay penalty is constructed. In this model, the base fares of responsive feeder buses and public bicycles are functions of the distance from the demand point to the metro station and the rental period, respectively. Then, the pricing game process under mutual competition between responsive feeder buses and public bicycles is analyzed. Moreover, a nested two-layer planning pricing model is constructed. Finally, a solution algorithm based on sensitivity analyses and a genetic algorithm is designed. The results show that this method can be used to effectively determine the unit fares and passenger flow sharing rates of RFT and public bicycles. Compared with that under the single-vehicle RFT operation mode, the RFT fare under the two-vehicle RFT operation mode is lower, and the passenger flow sharing rate is higher, which can significantly increase the social benefits. However, the total revenue of the operation is significantly reduced and thus requires greater financial input from the government. Under the dual-vehicle operation mode, the fares of public bicycles are greater than those of RFT, and the passenger flow sharing rate is low, which significantly reduces both the social benefits and the total benefits of the operation. With the improvement of the operation mode of the RFT system, the competitiveness of using public bicycles decreases.

Keywords

• Traffic engineering
• fare
• RFT
• bilevel programming
• game
• bike-sharing