Study on the evolutionary strategy of upward patient transfer in the loose medical consortia

Abstract

Medical institutions in loose medical consortia tend to have poor cooperation due to fragmented interests. We aim to explore any issues associated with patient upward transfer in a loose medical consortium system consisting of two tertiary hospitals with both cooperative and competitive relationships. A two-sided evolutionary game model was constructed to assess the stability of equilibrium strategy combinations in the process of interaction between game players under different cost-sharing scenarios and different degrees of penalties when running patient upward transfer between super triple-A hospitals (STH) and general triple-A hospitals (GTH). We found that a hospital's stabilization strategy was related to its revenue status. When a hospital has high/low revenues, it will treat patients negatively/positively, regardless of the strategy chosen by the other hospital. When the hospital has a medium revenue, the strategy choice will be related to the delay cost, delay cost sharing coefficient, government penalty and the strategic choice of the other hospital. Delay cost-sharing coefficient is an important internal factor affecting the cooperation in a medical consortium for patient upward transfer. External interventions, such as government penalty mechanisms, can improve the cooperation between hospitals when hospitals have moderate revenue.

Keywords

• loose medical consortia
• evolutionary game
• triple-a hospital
• delay cost