The Need for an International law-Informed Code of Conduct for Nuclear Command, Control and Communication

Abstract

Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems comprise a complex arrangement of people, policy, procedures, infrastructure, and law that governs when, why, how, and by whom the decision to launch a nuclear weapon will be made and executed. At its core, NC3 is designed to ensure that a nuclear weapon is launched only when sanctioned by proper authorities, and that no unsanctioned launch, either intentionally or accidentally, takes place. To be effective, NC3 systems must fulfill certain critical functions, including detection, warning, and attack characterization; nuclear planning and targeting; decision-making; receiving orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces. Current NC3 systems are beset by vulnerabilities, including susceptibility to cyber and other remote attacks, as well as weaknesses due to obsolete legacy technologies and complex command and communication structures. For NC3 systems to fulfill their objectives effectively and accurately, States need to adopt a code of conduct, similar to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, to outline both the relevant international law and the appropriate best practice that governs, and that should govern, State NC3, to ensure that there is never an intentional or accidental wrongful launch of a nuclear weapon.

Keywords

• Nuclear weapons
• nuclear command, control, and communications
• NC3
• Hague Code of Conduct
• nonbinding instruments
• international law