Cooperative Electricity-Hydrogen Trading Model for Optimizing Low-Carbon Travel Using Nash Bargaining Theory

Abstract

To further improve the utilization level of distributed photovoltaics (PV) and realize low-carbon travel, a novel optimization cooperative model that considers multi-stakeholders in-cluding integrated prosumers (IP), power to hydrogen (P2H), and grid company (GC) is proposed, based on the Nash bargaining theory. Electricity trading among the three and hydrogen trading between IP and P2H is considered in the model to maximize their own interests. Specifically, IP focus on distributed PV integration and low carbon travels, P2H strives to improve cost competitiveness of hydrogen, and electricity-hydrogen trading prices and quantities are optimized between them. Also, GC obtains profits by charging grid fees considering power flow constraints. The cooperation game model is transformed into a mixed-integer linear programming problem through linearization methods. Case studies show that electricity-hydrogen trading among the three has apparent advantages over pure electricity coupling or non-cooperation. With future reduction of investment prices of PV and P2H and maturity of the carbon trading market, the profit margin of this cooperation model can be further enhanced.

Keywords

• Distributed PV integration
• electric vehicle
• fuel cell vehicle
• low carbon travel
• nash bargaining
• power to hydrogen