Rawls et l’impôt progressif : deux arguments

Abstract

Contemporary political philosophers who draw on the work of John Rawls largely subscribe to the idea that progressive taxation is an essential tool for achieving social justice. Yet, while Rawls says little about fiscal issues, he does suggest that a proportional (rather than progressive) tax on consumption (rather than income) might be one aspect of the best tax system for a liberal democratic society. Coming from the most important progressive thinker of the last fifty years, this is a surprising proposition. Why would Rawls defend a form of taxation whose two components—consumption as the tax base and proportionality as the mode of taxation—tend to have regressive effects? Does this mean that Rawlsians should question their adherence to progressive taxation? Or should one simply abandon any reference to Rawls when it comes to defending this mode of taxation? In this article, I will take the investigation a step further to see whether his principles of justice, combined with contemporary evidence on the effects of different tax regimes, could justify a progressive income (or consumption) tax, even under ideal circumstances. I will present two arguments in this direction: the first insists on the need to protect the equal political freedom of citizens, the second is based on a rich conception of the principle of benefits, according to which all wealth in advanced democratic societies is a social product.

Keywords

• political philosophy
• Rawls (John)
• social justice
• Theory of Justice
• tax fairness
• progressive taxation