Epistemological Presuppositions for the Theistic Philosophy of A. Plantinga

Abstract

The author attempts to reconstruct the context surrounding the projects for a reformed epistemology and an affi rmation of the Christian faith by Alvin Plantinga. An analysis of Plantinga’s epistemological presuppositions reveals how they are intertwined. The basic problem surrounding the dispute between fundamentalists and anti-fundamentalists concerning the nature of knowledge constituted the background against which the theistic philosophy of Plantinga began to take form. Examining this dispute, the author of this article attempts to define the position of the philosophers in question and to clarify the differences in terminology which are found in the appropriate literature. The relationship between evidentialism and reliabilism on the one hand and internalism and externalism on the other is noted. The author distinguishes between an early (weak) and later (strong) type of reformed epistemology. In the former type, Plantinga was concerned with refuting the classical version of epistemological fundamentalism; in the latter, he concentrated his attention on constructing a philosophical scheme which could grant to the basic teachings of theism an epistemological foundation. The author discusses and analyses the main objections to Plantinga. These objections are of two kinds: theological and philosophical. The philosophical objections are aimed at the epistemological presuppositions suggested by Plantinga. The author concludes that, in spite of the value and longevity of Plantiga’s arguments, the solutions to the questions which he raised are dependent on contemporary discussions of analytical epistemology.

Keywords

• Alvin Plantinga
• reformed epistemology
• fundamentalism. anti-fundamentalism
• basic dogmas
• model of Aquinas/ Calvin
• objection de jure
• objection de facto
• Great Pumpkin Objection
• affirmation
• affirmation of Christian faith