More children nutrition distribution, less labor incentive: Evidence from Chinese collective agriculture

Abstract

Distribution system will affect the labor incentive that has been heatedly discussed by recent literatures. Using a unique micro dataset, this paper demonstrates that the equalitarian distribution system is one of the reasons for the insufficient labor incentive during the Chinese Collective Agriculture period. Specifically speaking, in the distribution of basic rations, the proportion for children (aged 1–3 and 4–7 years) was often beyond their nutrition demand, resulting the dissatisfaction of other families with more laborers and less children, thus these households will reduce their labor supply gradually. At the same time, the existence of outstanding accounts makes it a failure to use work points to buy distributions, which is the mechanism of the distribution system and insufficient labor incentive. All the results have been accepted by the robustness tests. The study will help to understand the distribution system and labor incentive, as well as the failure of the Chinese collective agriculture.

Keywords

• ratio of children's nutrition distribution
• labor incentive
• outstanding accounts
• Chinese collective agriculture