Theological Compatibilism and Essential Properties

Abstract

Alvin Plantinga defends Theological Compatibilism (TC) and Essentialism about property possession (E). TC is the claim that human freedom to act otherwise and God's essential omniscience are compatible, while E is the claim that every individual entity whatsoever has a modal profile consisting in having both essential and accidental properties. I purport to show that, if E is assumed in the argument for TC, then the latter leads to a very puzzling upshot. I also intend to show that, even if TC is suitably fixed in order to avoid that upshot, TC is still unconvincing in that it merges into one the de re and the de dicto rendering of 'human freedom to act otherwise'; I end up by briefly sketching why the two renderings should instead be kept well apart.

Keywords

• Theological compatibilism
• Essentialism
• Plantinga