SUSPENSION OF START III IN CONTEXT OF THE DETERRENCE THEORY

Abstract

The article examines the prospects for changing the security balance after Russia’s sus- pension of the START Treaty. The author analyzes the possibilities of creating asymmetric advan- tages for Russia from the positions of offensive and defensive realism, the theory of deterrence and the bargaining model of war in order to change the hostile position of the United States. Obviously, strategic stability cannot be maintained without taking into account the confrontation between Rus- sia and the United States over Ukraine and the desire to defeat Russia at the hands of Ukraine. Fol- lowing the theory of deterrence, Russia can create a number of asymmetric advantages (defensive and offensive) that can pose a threat to US interests and change the architecture of strategic stabil- ity. Asymmetric advantages are seen as preparation for actions sensitive to the US security – as in- formation, warning signal, that exerts pressure. The hypothesis is put forward about the effect of an asymmetric advantage on a change the policy of the opposite side, if the perception of the future benefits of continuing the policy is less than the perception of future losses. The opposite side can change its policy if the threat of the deterrent side leaves no doubt. The threat can achieve its goal if all parties (NATO members, third parties) draw conclusions from its reality. The reaction of third parties is of great importance for Russia and the United States. Asymmetric measures, that create a threat, are a sequence of actions, not verbal threats that are not supported by information about actual preparations. It is important for Russia to convince the United States that all asymmetric measures are only counterbalance of American policy.

Keywords

• new start treaty
• deterrence
• security balance
• signal function
• asymmetric ad- vantage
• offensive realism
• defensive realism
• bargaining model of war.