Technological Innovation Investment Channels of Industry–University–Research Alliance Enterprises and Non-Alliance Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

Abstract

According to their resource ownership and resource acquisition channels, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of enterprises’ technological innovation investment channels considering managers’ expectations. This results in the strategy of non-alliance firms along the first channel having a significant impact on the evolutionary equilibrium. For non-alliance enterprises, the difference in the amount of investment in the R&D stage has the same impact on the probability of such enterprises following the first channel. The number of active managers, group capacity, the difference in managers’ expectations, and the difference in the amount of technological innovation investment in the R&D stage have significant differences in the possibility of choosing the first channel between the two types of enterprises. The research conclusions can provide valuable references for enterprises to make technological innovation decisions.

Keywords

• evolutionary game
• industry–university–research alliance
• technological innovation
• investment channels