Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence
Ralf H.J.M. Kurvers,
Uri Hertz,
Jurgis Karpus,
Marta P. Balode,
Bertrand Jayles,
Ken Binmore,
Bahador Bahrami
Affiliations
Ralf H.J.M. Kurvers
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany; Corresponding author
Uri Hertz
Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, 199 Aba Khoushy Avenue Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel
Jurgis Karpus
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, General and Experimental Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Leopoldstr. 13, 80802 Munich, Germany; Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany
Marta P. Balode
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany
Bertrand Jayles
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany
Ken Binmore
Department of Economics, University College London, Drayton House, 30 Gordon St, London WC1H 0AX, UK
Bahador Bahrami
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany; Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, General and Experimental Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Leopoldstr. 13, 80802 Munich, Germany; Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham Surrey, London TW20 0EX, UK
Summary: Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple influencers competing for it. We study which strategy maximizes social influence under competition. Applying game theory to a scenario where two advisers compete for the attention of a client, we find that the rational solution for advisers is to communicate truthfully when favored by the client, but to lie when ignored. Across seven pre-registered studies, testing 802 participants, such a strategic adviser consistently outcompeted an honest adviser. Strategic dishonesty outperformed truth-telling in swaying individual voters, the majority vote in anonymously voting groups, and the consensus vote in communicating groups. Our findings help explain the success of political movements that thrive on disinformation, and vocal underdog politicians with no credible program.
