Understanding the Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare: The Case of the Tet Offensive, 1968

Abstract

This study analyses how the Tet Offensive of the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong in 1968, the turning point of the Vietnam War, achieved political victory despite a military defeat. War, in general, and guerrilla struggle, in particular, is a process of violent events involving political goals. In this sense, one of the most important goals of the armed struggle is to impose the superiority of the will on the opponent with the least loss of life. Psychology is among the most important variables of this challenge. As a matter of fact, the greatest success in war is to break the resistance of the opponent by keeping the damage to a minimum. In this context, guerrilla warfare, as a war of attrition that includes unconventional warfare methods, is a field of study revealing psychological elements. This study aims to explain the strategic nature of guerrilla warfare through the example of the Tet Offensive in 1968. The Tet Offensive, which has been widely accepted in the literature to be the turning point of the Vietnam War, is essential in understanding how a military defeat can achieve political success. This military attack, in which the Viet Kong guerrillas suffered seven times more damage than their adversaries, drove the adversaries of Viet Kong guerrillas into despair about the Vietnam War. This study analyses how the Tet Offensive achieved political victory despite a military defeat. The historical limitation of the study is between 1967 and 1975. The study is expected to contribute to Turkish literature by examining the issue of guerrilla warfare through the Tet Offensive. The analysis shows that the intangible dimensions of the war such as psychological aspects can be one of the determining factors of the war in terms of its capacity and the impact it creates.

Keywords

• guerrilla warfare
• tet offensive
• strategy
• vietnam war
• viet cong