Études Platoniciennes (May 2022)
The problem of (in)divisible intellect in Proclus’ Elements of theology 180
Abstract
Does Proclus’ transcendent intellect have parts? Modern editors of the Elements of Theology disagree on a crucial proposition where Proclus reveals the mereological nature of intellect. In his seminal critical edition, E.R. Dodds emended proposition 180 of the work by adding a negation, in order to form πᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστίν, <οὐχ> ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστάς (Dodds 1963, 158.11). This emendation, Dodds claimed, was necessary in order to avoid a contradiction with proposition 171 of the same work. Yet some translators and editors have chosen to ignore Dodds’s emendation, suggesting that the contradiction feared by Dodds is not as problematic as it seems – for example, E.O. Onnasch and B. Schomakers render the Greek as πᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστίν, ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστάς ἕκαστος (Onnasch and Schomakers 2015, 196.3-4). This paper deals with two related topics. Firstly, I argue that Dodds’s emendation is to be avoided, not merely because his contradiction could be weakened, as others have claimed, but also because the insertion of a negative creates a philological issue of its own, namely a contradiction with propositions 67 through 69 of the Elements. Secondly, I discuss how, based on this reading, Proclus ascribes to intellect a wholeness that is relative, similar to the way Porphyry describes the mereology of intellect. Although Proclus seemingly rejects Porphyry’s mereological ideas in his other writings, I argue that this ultimately comes down to a difference in terminology.
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