Frontiers in Psychology (Sep 2011)
Have we vindicated the motivational unconscious yet? A conceptual review
Abstract
Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconsciousstates that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconsciouscharacter typically results from a form of repression. The basicargument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the bestexplanation to some seemingly non rational behaviors, like akrasia,impulsivity or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has beenchallenged on theoretical, empirical and conceptual grounds. Drawingon recent works on apparent self-deception and on the ‘cognitiveunconscious’ I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if thereis a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empiricalvindications of the M-unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for theconceptual objections, they compel us to modify the classical pictureof the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states and processesmust be affective states and processes that the subject reallyfeels and experiences —and which are in this sense conscious— eventhough they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible to him. Dualprocess psychology and the literature on cold-hot empathy gaps partlysupport the existence of such M-unconscious states.
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