Is Affective Intentionality Necessarily Irrelevant in Social Cognition?

Phenomenology and Mind. 2016;(2) DOI 10.13128/Phe_Mi-19628

 

Journal Homepage

Journal Title: Phenomenology and Mind

ISSN: 2280-7853 (Print); 2239-4028 (Online)

Publisher: Firenze University Press

Society/Institution: Research Centres of San Raffaele University

LCC Subject Category: Philosophy. Psychology. Religion: Aesthetics | Philosophy. Psychology. Religion: Ethics

Country of publisher: Italy

Language of fulltext: Italian, French, English

Full-text formats available: PDF

 

AUTHORS

Sarah Songhorian

EDITORIAL INFORMATION

Double blind peer review

Editorial Board

Instructions for authors

Time From Submission to Publication: 25 weeks

 

Abstract | Full Text

The aim of this work is to understand the meaning and the extent of “affective intentionality”, to discover whether or not it is analogous to other concepts of intentionality and if it can play a role in social cognition. I will compare Searle’s conception of intentionality, in particular affective intentionality, with Scheler’s concept of sympathy. The reason for this is that I believe the comparison shows that it is not always necessary to presuppose something to have affective intentionality.