THE APORIAI OF INTELLECT IN ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA III 4

Abstract

In this paper I provide a global reading of Aristotle’s De Anima III 4 aimed at unveiling the rigorous argumentative structure of the chapter, which I show to exhibit the typical Aristotelian pattern of philosophical inquiry: a setting of the agenda of basic questions to be answered; a dialectical path to the position of a hypothesis; a derivation from it of relevant individu¬ating features of the object, some of which are already manifest and are accounted for as derivable from the hypothesis; and the emergence of aporiai that prima facie seem to invalidate the hypothesis but eventually allow for a deeper understanding of it. I attempt to reveal the speculative progression of the chapter by initially regarding the Actuality Principle as underlying his Assimilation Model of cognition (S cognizes F iff S’s cognitive principle becomes F due to a cognized object O that is F in actuality). Aristotle derives Unmixedness from not having limits of scope (Unlimitedness Asssumption), which is a manifest feature of νοῦς, from Unmixedness he derives Separability (these entail-ments are clarified through the first aporia), from Separability Spontaneity and from Spontaneity Self-thinkability of νοῦς (clarified through the second aporia). Although I examine the whole chapter, I focus specifically on the theoretical and methodological value of introducing and addressing the two aporiai.

Keywords

• aristotle
• nous
• soul
• psychology
• thinking