The Importance of Sensing Own's Movements in the World for the Sense of Personal Identity

Abstract

Within philosophy and cognitive science, the focus in relation to the problem of personal identity has been almost exclusively on the brain. We submit that the resulting neglect of the body and of bodily movements in the world has been detrimental in understanding how organisms develop a sense of identity. We examine the importance of sensing one’s own movements for the development of a basic, nonconceptual sense of self. More specifically, we argue that the origin of the sense of self stems from the sensitivity to spontaneous movements. Based on this, the organism develops a sense of “I move” and, finally, a sense of “I can move”. Proprioception and kinesthesis are essential in this development. At the same time, we argue against the traditional dichotomy between so-called external and internal senses, agreeing with Gibson that perception of the self and of the environment invariably go together. We discuss a traditional distinction between two aspects of bodily self: the body sense and the body image. We suggest that they capture different aspects of the sense of self. We argue that especially the body sense is of great importance to our nonconceptual sense of self. Finally, we attempt to draw some consequences for research in cognitive science, specifically in the area of robotics, by examining a case of missing proprioception. We make a plea for robots to be equipped not just with external perceptual and motor abilities but also with a sense of proprioception. This, we submit, would constitute one further step towards understanding creatures acting in the world with a sense of themselves.

Keywords

• Self
• Personal Identity
• Proprioception
• Movement
• Body