Центральноевропейские исследования (Jan 2022)

The referendum on republika Srpska’s national day — a political response to the abuse of historical policy

  • Georgi N. Engelhardt

DOI
https://doi.org/10.31168/2619-0877.2018.1.7
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 10, no. 1
pp. 143 – 164

Abstract

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The National Day Referendum of September 25, 2016 has so far remained the only successful attempt of the Republika Srpska’s authorities of holding a plebiscite within the republic. Previously, Banja Luka had been forced by strong international pressure to abandon three such attempts - on issues of higher political significance. On the one hand, this shows the absence of immediate political implications of the vote on the status of the National Day; on the other, it demonstrated once again the intense confrontation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethnic communities in the field of symbols and key historical stereotypes, especially with regards to events from their recent history, namely the Bosnian civil war of 1992–1995. However, the relatively insignificant National Day issue gave the President of the RS, Milorad Dodik a chance to establish a precedent in the history of Bosnia of the Dayton agreement by holding a separate referendum at the level of the republic. Supported by the Western powers, the efforts of the Bosniak leader Bakir Izetbegović to tread on the Bosnian Serbs’ interests in the field of historical policy and symbolics in fact afforded the President of the RS an opportunity to strengthen the autonomy of his republic. Milorad Dodik efficiently used the strong pressure from Sarajevo and the West along with the support from Russia for Bosnian Serb national mobilisation that resulted in massive electoral support — 99 % of 56 % voters that took part in the ballot were in favour of 9 January to be proclaimed the Republika Srpska’s National Day. In spite of the strong outside pressure, Dodik triumphed in carrying out a major political action and establishing a base for Banja Luka’s future independent political ventures. He also demonstrated utmost caution and pragmatism as he exploited further the 25 September Referendum. Although engaging in brinkmanship, he never crossed the red line of escalation into a regional conflict and/or direct Western intervention.

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