The EU’s initiatives to regulate lobbyists: good or bad administration?

Abstract

The Joint Transparency Register (JTR) represents a positive change from its predecessors, which can be explained based on ‘policy learning’. We support this argument by providing findings on two dimensions: First, we measure the strength of EU’s lobbying law compared to other political systems that have enacted such. We find that the EU’s initial attempts to regulate lobbying at the EP (1996) and Commission (2008) are less robust and efficacious. Second, we analyze the evolution of registrations of lobbyists from 2008 to 2013. We also consider developments in the automobile, airline and electricity sectors and highlight the corporations’ willingness to register and fully disclose lobbying costs. The paper closes by considering future challenges the JTR needs to address, before it can be considered an example of ‘good administration.’ Received: 10 April 2014 Accepted: 10 June 2014 Published online: 15 April 2016

Keywords

• lobbying regulation
• European Union
• joint transparency register